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Introduction
Of all political power resources in Indonesia, material power is by far the most 
concentrated, versatile, durable, and least constrained. The gap in material power 
across the population is among the largest in the world. Data from 2010 show that the 
average net worth of Indonesia's forty richest oligarchs is over 630,000 times the 
country's GDP per capita (in Thailand and South Korea the gap is 190,000 and 69,000 
times, respectively). Although these oligarchs constitute less than 2/l,000,000ths of the 
population, their combined assets equal 10 percent of GDP.1 Even if we widen the lens 
to include the 43,000 Indonesians with liquid financial assets of at least US$1 million, 
the result is still an extraordinary concentration of material power resources in very 
few hands.2 Although these individuals represent barely 2/10,000ths of the population, 
on average they have at their disposal financial assets that are 1,220 times the annual 
income of the median Indonesian. Their combined assets equal fully 25 percent of 
GDP. Indonesia is following the classic pattern of capitalist development: as living
1 For further comparisons, see Table 1 later in this article.
2 The global wealth management industry calls these people high net-worth individuals, or HNWIs. In 
2004, Indonesia had about 34,000 HNWIs with at least US$1 million in non-home financial assets, 19,000 of 
whom were Indonesians residing semi-permanently in Singapore. Their ranks grew to 39,000 by 2007. The 
average wealth of Indonesia's HNWIs in 2010 was US$4.1 million, and their combined net worth was 
about US$177 billion (US$93 billion of which was held offshore in Singapore). See Capgemini, "World 
Wealth Report," Capgemini and Merrill Lynch, Inc., 2011; and "Forbes 40 Richest," Forbes, November 23, 
2011, at www.forbes.com/lists/2011/ 80/ indonesia-billionaires-ll_land.html. Gini coefficients, which are 
an extremely blunt measure, compare the resources of the top fifth of society against the bottom fifth. They 
do not capture the extremes reported here because oligarchs make up only a fraction of the top 1 percent, 
and their wealth is invisible when commingled with that of the entire top 20 percent.
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standards at the bottom and middle of society gradually improve, a small number of 
ultra-wealthy citizens at the top are rapidly pulling away from the rest.
The starting point for understanding contemporary Indonesian politics is the 
observation that extreme material inequality necessarily produces extreme political 
inequality. Whether in democracies or authoritarian systems, the more unequal the 
distribution of wealth is, the more exaggerated the power and influence of enriched 
individuals becomes, and the more intensely the material gap itself colors the political 
motives and objectives of oligarchs. Whatever other more dispersed power resources 
exist across society—such as the small individual influence conferred by one-person- 
one-vote under Indonesia's democracy, or leverage based on mobilization and direct 
action by activists and labor—it is this gross asymmetry in material power that shapes, 
dominates, and warps the country's ordinary politics. Oligarchic theory best captures 
the power and politics of extreme wealth concentration in Indonesia's political 
economy and brings into relief its role within the country's social formation.
Wealth is the most potent and flexible of all power resources for influencing 
political outcomes during non-crisis periods, and those who deploy wealth power have 
a political impact far out of proportion to their numbers in society. Although 
concentrated wealth profoundly shapes politics in every country, it does so to varying 
degrees depending on the effectiveness of limits designed to dampen its use for direct 
and indirect political objectives, and on the strength mustered by other actors across 
the political spectrum. Material power is much less reliable during major crises, 
disruptive periods of upheaval and violence, and episodes of high social mobilization. 
In these circumstances, other power resources tend to overwhelm the political 
influence of wealth. Except in cases where crises lead to the destruction of oligarchs 
themselves—as occurred in the revolutions engulfing Russia, China, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Cuba—the disruption of the wealth power of oligarchs is rarely 
permanent. And as several of these cases demonstrate, even the thorough elimination 
of oligarchs across decades does not preclude their reemergence under conditions that 
once again favor the accumulation of large fortunes in private hands.
In Indonesia, the impact of material power on the country's ordinary politics is 
particularly exaggerated for two main reasons: there are few effective limits on the use 
of money for political and wealth-defense objectives, and countervailing power 
resources (particularly in civil society) are very weak. The claim is not that oligarchs, 
who are a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia, are the only political actors 
worthy of scholarly attention, that they always win, or that there are not many 
important political matters about which oligarchs have no strong or common interest 
(there is no coherent oligarchic position on central control versus regional autonomy, 
for instance). Rather, it is that the power of oligarchs is formidable and that their 
influence over the country's politics is deep and distorting. Ironically, because of the 
myriad ways available for oligarchs to express their power within Indonesia's 
democracy, their role is arguably greater since Suharto's fall than before the transition. 
To the dismay of progressive Indonesians and their allies abroad, the wealth power of 
oligarchs shapes and constrains Indonesia's democracy far more than democracy 
constrains the power of wealth. There is nothing necessarily permanent about this 
oligarchic dominance. But for the present, oligarchs and oligarchy rightfully hold a 
central place in the analysis of Indonesian politics.
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Power Resource Theory and Oligarchs
A focus on oligarchs and oligarchy is rooted in power resource theory. As 
articulated by Korpi, this theory starts with the distribution of power capacities across 
members of a political community. It argues that "we should reverse the behavioral 
approach and begin the study of power with power resources rather than with the 
exercise of power."3 Differences in power resources, especially when they are large, 
affect what various actors or groups in a society can do, including what they might 
threaten, or merely be reasonably anticipated, to do. The forms of power that matter— 
how they are blended, who has power and on what scale, and how power distributions 
are shifting—are all difficult to assess. Contending actors must constantly evaluate 
their own power resources and those of others, and act accordingly.
Power resource theory recognizes that influence and leverage can be difficult to 
measure, and that power held is not always power used. I might possess tremendous 
power capacities and yet never display them because others whose interests conflict 
with mine already understand what I am capable of and allow me to prevail without 
provoking me to act. This outcome constitutes a very real manifestation of power, 
however silent or invisible its expression. I can also free-ride as others with similar 
interests fight the political battles and achieve the desired outcomes for me. Or I might 
benefit from prior political victories that produced policies, norms, or institutions that 
structurally satisfy my core political goals (at least for the present). In such 
circumstances, political inaction leaves no trace evidence or data points hinting at the 
immensity of my power or revealing how my vital political interests are being 
satisfied.
With its emphasis on capacities, power resource theory posits that at any given 
time every member of society possesses some quantum of power, ranging from very 
small (almost zero) to immense. If we could estimate the power capacities of each 
person, we could rank members of society from least to most powerful. A non- 
exhaustive list of key power resources includes formal political rights, official positions 
(both inside and outside government), coercive power, mobilizational power, and 
material power.4 The first four of these, when distributed in highly exclusive or 
concentrated ways, are the basis of what is generally known as "elite" politics. The last 
one, material power, is the basis of oligarchy. All five of these power resources exist in 
Indonesia, and each plays a role in the country's politics. For instance, formal political 
rights, which range from citizenship to the opportunity for all adults to participate 
politically and vote in the country's various democratic contests, are important not 
only on election day, but also prior to elections via the polling-posturing-positioning 
game that takes place among parties and top political contenders (both of which are 
heavily populated by oligarchs). Official positions, whether as government officials or 
as leaders of major organizations such as parties, corporations, unions, religious 
organizations, and even huge soccer clubs, are an enormous power resource for the 
individuals who hold them because these persons can exercise the rule-based
3 Walter Korpi, "Developments in the Theory of Power and Exchange," Sociological Theory 3,2 (1985): 33.
For a sophisticated discussion of power resource theory and a critique of competing approaches (including 
pluralism), see Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in 
Latin America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 35-40.
4 Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 11-20.
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prerogatives of the entities they oversee and, by virtue of office, deploy its resources 
and personnel (which can include police, soldiers, and security staff). Coercive power 
resources refer to non-official capacities to unleash violence. A general in a country's 
armed forces is empowered by official position; a warlord or mafia figure is 
empowered by access to means of coercion and by personal command over armed 
followers or underlings.
Mobilizational power refers both to the capacity of some elites to move others in 
politically formidable ways (as Sukarno did before becoming president, or as Gandhi 
or Martin Luther King, Jr. did as activists) and to the power-augmenting status of 
being mobilized. Hundreds of thousands (or millions) of people who are otherwise 
minimally empowered can, in concert, become tremendously powerful when they are 
organized into a union or perhaps mobilized for mass actions that disrupt the politics 
of the ordinary (often short-circuiting or overwhelming oligarchic power in the 
process). Except when well institutionalized, most manifestations of mobilizational 
power are episodic and very difficult to sustain due to the great personal demands 
mobilization places on participants.5
Material power, the last category, is the basis of oligarchic power. Oligarchs are 
actors empowered by wealth—a power resource that stands out among the other 
forms. It is by far the most versatile in that it is easily converted into other 
manifestations of power. This can range from buying offices and political-legal 
outcomes to hiring masses and armed militia. Wealth is unique in that it can be 
deployed through others for its own defense, while making few direct personal 
demands on oligarchs themselves. Unlike workers or demonstrators, oligarchs can 
sleep, play, or be far away while their wealth power is fully engaged around the clock 
and for decades if necessary. It is oligarchic resources that get exhausted, not oligarchs.
Throughout history, extreme concentrations of wealth have faced constant political 
and social challenges. Great fortunes in the hands of a few attract threats from various 
directions—from the non-rich, from states or powerful rulers above, or laterally from 
other oligarchs. The unique political challenge for oligarchs, and the basis of oligarchy,
is defending against these threats.6
Oligarchy does not refer to a system of rule by a particular set of actors. It 
describes the political processes and arrangements associated with a small 
number of wealthy individuals who are not only uniquely empowered by their 
material resources, but set apart in a manner that necessarily places them in 
conflict with large segments of the community (often including each other). 
Oligarchy centers on the political challenges of defending concentrated wealth. 
The oligarchies that have existed since the dawn of settled human history and
5 Ideology is not a power resource in its own right that can be "held" or possessed by an individual actor. 
Rather, ideologies are contested and constructed ideas developed by multiple actors over time. They 
reflect the relative strength of other power resources—with the greatest contest since the mid-nineteenth 
century being between those wielding material power and the mobilizational power of workers. For a 
careful treatment of this contest, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. 
Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
6 This political activity by individual oligarchs has the salutary effect of defending material stratification 
itself, whether or not oligarchs think systemically or collude for this purpose.
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that continue to exist today differ according to how those political challenges 
have been met.7
In other words, oligarchy is defined by the politics of wealth defense, and it assumes 
different forms as the threats to and responses by oligarchs change. Oligarchs can 
stand alone and rule, or they can be embedded within authoritarian regimes and 
democracies. Important variations in oligarchy depend on whether oligarchs are 
armed or disarmed and, by extension, whether they are involved in the violence at the 
root of all exclusive claims and rights to property. It also matters whether oligarchs are 
directly engaged in rule, and, if so, whether they rule as individuals or as a group. 
Combinations of these factors result in four types of oligarchy: warring, ruling, 
sultanistic, and civil.8 During Dutch rule there were no Indonesian oligarchs to speak 
of. The country evolved into a classic example of sultanistic oligarchy under Suharto. 
Since 1998, it has become an electoral ruling oligarchy, fusing strong elements of 
democracy and ruling oligarchy, but without effective institutions of law to guarantee 
the impersonal defense of property and wealth.
Oligarchs are distinct from elites, who exert their minority influence based on non­
material power resources (the first four types elaborated above). The categories of 
oligarch and elite can be layered upon each other, with oligarchic power potentially 
leading to elite power (and vice versa). But there is no necessary overlap. Many 
oligarchs have only material power resources at their disposal, and many elites never 
amass empowering fortunes. It is also important to recognize that democracy and 
oligarchy are not necessarily zero-sum political phenomena, as the Indonesian case 
clearly shows. Oligarchs are the political product of extreme material stratification in 
society rather than the result of a democratic deficit. It follows that democratic 
transitions have no automatic effect on the power resources available to oligarchs, and 
thus on oligarchy.
Democracy and oligarchy are defined by distributions of radically different kinds 
of power. Democracy refers to dispersed formal political power based on rights, 
procedures, and levels of popular participation. By contrast, oligarchy is defined 
by concentrated material power based on enforced claims or rights to property or 
wealth. The nature of the political powers that get widened or narrowed as 
systems become more or less democratic is distinct from the political powers that 
can be dispersed or concentrated materially. This is why democracy and 
oligarchy are remarkably compatible provided the two realms of power do not 
clash.9
Oligarchs are aware that democracy poses potential new threats, and the historical 
record dating back to Aristotle is filled with nervous commentary from the wealthy on 
how democratic power in the hands of the many could challenge stratification by 
taking and redistributing the wealth of the few. But such clashes have been 
infrequent—both because oligarchs are always present and vigilant at moments of 
democratic founding (thus ensuring that various wealth-defending safeguards are
7 Winters, Oligarchy, p. 39.
8 For a further elaboration and theorization of these types of oligarchies, see ibid., chapter 1, and passim.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
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built into the institutions, laws, and practices of participatory polities, as James 
Madison and his colleagues did in the US case), and because the formidable capacities 
of oligarchs to punish hyper-performing democracies are well known and tested at 
one's peril.
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto represents a complex but stable blend of 
oligarchy and democracy, with wealth-power pervading a political arrangement that 
tolerates and responds to popular participation. The country's political system evolved 
rapidly into an electoral ruling oligarchy in which holding office is increasingly linked 
to private wealth.10 Indonesia is, moreover, an important example of what might be 
termed democracy without law. Some oligarchs are directly engaged in rule as they 
operate within party institutions and compete for office according to basic democratic 
norms. At the same time, they and others outside the ruling group engage in an 
obligatory process of wealth transfers among each other (bagi-bagi) as oligarchs and 
elites compete over who gets to keep the riches from the archipelago's natural and 
agricultural resources. Having rules and norms in the democratic political realm does 
not ensure oligarchs are tamed by impersonal institutions of law. Quite the contrary: 
law in Indonesia routinely bends to oligarchs and elites, even as it applies in a 
mundane (if technically flawed) manner to the vast majority of the population. Thus, 
Indonesia is not a lawless society. Rather, its "rule of law" problems are primarily due 
to the inability of the legal system to tame the ultra-powerful.
Given that oligarchy can be readily blended with democracy and other political 
forms, it means that oligarchic theory neither denies nor conflicts with other 
approaches that examine the role of actors or groups in civil society struggling to shape 
policy or win key political battles. There are issues about which there is no coherent 
oligarchic stance or interest, and there are also matters about which oligarchs care 
deeply and yet clash spectacularly among themselves. Meanwhile, social organization 
and movements from below can fluctuate significantly over time, and people-power 
moments can burst onto the political stage with very little warning. An 
acknowledgement of tremendous oligarchic power does not imply that other power 
resources, particularly mobilizational power and popular participation, are irrelevant. 
The challenge is to understand when, how, and how long they become dominant and 
decisive (as they briefly did in 1998).
This article traces how oligarchs incubated during Suharto's New Order quickly 
came to dominate Indonesia's new democracy as the regime collapsed and how their 
control has deepened since 1998.11 The central argument is that from a power resource 
perspective, oligarchs are disproportionately influential actors within Indonesia's 
political economy, that they arose and gained power during Suharto's New Order, and 
that the transition to democracy does not constitute a significant disruption or even 
diminution of their power. Oligarchy itself changed dramatically with Suharto's fall—
10 The wealth is already owned prior to gaining office or is quickly amassed after supporting oligarchs 
deploy their resources to elevate individuals to elite positions (which the newly elevated almost always 
use to grab enough wealth to reduce their reliance on oligarchs by becoming one themselves).
11 In addition to Winters, Oligarchy, see also Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise o f  Capital (Sheffield: 
Equinox Publishing, 1986); Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in 
Indonesia: The Politics o f Oligarchy in an Age o f  Markets (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).
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shifting from the sultanistic to the ruling form—with important consequences for how 
wealth defense is attempted and secured in Indonesia. But oligarchy did not disappear. 
The emphasis in this piece is on how oligarchic power is manifested in contemporary 
Indonesia. Although oligarchs and oligarchy are not the sole focus of the country's 
politics, they constitute its most important element as long as ordinary citizens remain 
poorly organized and minimally empowered.
Emergence of Oligarchs in Indonesia
The oligarchic capture of Indonesian democracy began with a group of oligarchs 
who played a background role in Suharto's collapse and experienced virtually no 
disruptions in their ranks during the years of political transformation. But 
accompanying the transition from dictatorship to democracy was an equally important 
transition: from a sultanistic oligarchy under which the ultra-rich were tamed 
personally by Suharto, to a more chaotic electoral ruling oligarchy under which there 
are far fewer effective constraints on oligarchic power. The capacity to use wealth 
strategically has emerged as one of the most vital power resources in Indonesian 
electoral politics.
Unlike in the Philippines, where landed oligarchs took root during the nineteenth 
century under the Spanish, the Dutch East Indies had only elites and no oligarchs 
during the colonial period. Despite government programs designed to foster 
entrepreneurs, the Sukarno years from World War II through the late 1960s were far 
too chaotic economically and politically for a group of Indonesians empowered by 
concentrated wealth to emerge. It was during the sultanistic rule of Suharto that 
Indonesia's modern oligarchs first arose. He not only created the country's oligarchs 
practically out of nothing, but he controlled them like a mafia Godfather. No matter 
how big or rich you became, Suharto could break you. All issues of wealth defense, 
property claims, and contracts radiated out from the Don. This put a premium on the 
politics of proximity—being close to Suharto mattered more than anything else. The 
more that was at stake financially, the more vital it was to have access to the inner 
circles around the dictator, if not to the man himself.
Suharto began as a member of the Indonesian elite holding the formal office of 
general in the armed forces. But he quickly became ultra-wealthy and thus became an 
oligarch himself—ruling a sultanistic oligarchy as first among equals. A key element in 
operating such a sultanistic oligarchy is that all competing bases of independent power 
must be subverted. Suharto and his cronies made sure this was the case across the 
entire economy and bureaucracy. We know from the work of Daniel Lev that it was 
not Suharto who first attacked Indonesia's legal system.12 Lev reminds us that the 
relatively strong and independent legal infrastructure that existed in the early 1950s 
was attacked first by General Nasution and President Sukarno. Suharto finished the job 
and made sure that the only recourse oligarchs had, and the only thing that could 
reliably tame them, was the dictator himself. His most significant contribution to
12 See Daniel S. Lev, "Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State," Indonesia 40 (October 1985): 
57-74; Daniel S. Lev, Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia: Selected Essays (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000); and Daniel S. Lev, "The State and Law Reform in Indonesia," in Law Reform in 
Developing and Transitional States, ed. Tim Lindsey (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).
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Indonesia's crippled system of law after 1965 was to make sure it could not recover 
from the devastating blows it sustained during Sukarno's Guided Democracy period.
Indonesia's new stratum of oligarchs was built up in phases and driven initially by 
General Suharto's efforts to consolidate his regime once Sukarno was pushed aside. 
Suharto focused first on extracting national wealth that could be channeled to buy off 
potential competitors in the armed forces. He encouraged early business partnerships 
between ethnic Chinese Indonesians and the generals. By the mid-1970s, erstwhile 
Chinese traders emerged as oligarchs in their own right. It was in the early 1980s that 
Suharto paid more attention to pribumi Indonesians through instruments like "Team 
10."13 Later in that same decade, Suharto's children arose as the last significant group 
of oligarchs. Indeed, one of the most important factors that weakened Suharto's New 
Order was his grown children's capacity to disrupt the system of wealth defense and 
oligarchic taming based on the politics of proximity to the dictator. Suharto's children, 
whose access to their father trumped all other channels of security for oligarchs, 
rapidly became the most predatory and disruptive force within Indonesia's oligarchy. 
Suharto refused to limit or punish his children, and thus for other oligarchs it was no 
longer possible to turn to him to safeguard property, enforce business deals, limit 
predations, and manage risks (most of which were increasingly coming from the kids 
themselves). The New Order went from being a highly predictable and reasonably 
tamed oligarchy, which tends to promote investment, to being a frustrating and 
increasingly risky system for oligarchs to navigate within. Not only did Suharto's 
children engage in predatory behaviors that threatened domestic and foreign oligarchs 
and weakened the economy, but a broader cohort of predatory actors linked to the 
children grabbed a piece of the action as well.
Once it became clear that powerful figures like General Benny Murdani and even 
General Prabowo Subianto could pay a high price with Suharto for speaking up about 
the friction his children were causing, Indonesia's oligarchs knew that the reliable 
system of security and response based on proximity to Cendana, Suharto's private 
residence, had broken down. Cendana was increasingly the source of wealth threats 
rather than the epicenter of wealth defense. The final straw came when Suharto started 
grooming some of his children for political succession. This ominous development 
occurred in the years just prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 1997. It is not that 
Indonesia's elites and oligarchs (and equally frustrated foreign counterparts in places 
like Washington, DC, and New York) worked and plotted to bring Suharto down. 
Rather, they quietly but actively abandoned him as he faced what would be the final 
economic shock of his reign. It was readily apparent to everyone, not least the students 
beginning to assemble in the streets, that Suharto was exposed and politically 
vulnerable.
When the dust finally settled, and democracy took shape, all of the oligarchs and 
elites were still there. Virtually none went down with Suharto except one or two who 
stood by him to the end. Although oligarchic and elite continuity was nearly 100 
percent, two things had changed. One was that the actors at the top had to adapt to the 
new democratic game. Not only did they do this with relative ease, but they were 
better positioned than anyone else to capture and dominate Indonesia's money-driven
13 For an extensive discussion of Team 10 (Tim Keppres 10), see Winters, Power in Motion, chapters 3-4.
Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia 19
electoral politics. Whereas many oligarchs in the Philippines and some Latin American 
democracies are armed and can engage their militias against each other, for historical 
reasons Indonesia's oligarchs were disarmed from the start. This has facilitated the 
game of divvying up the democratic spoils among them and helped keep the 
competition fairly orderly. The oligarchs have the money, media empires, networks, 
and positions in the parties (or the resources to create new ones) that allow them to 
dominate the new democratic system and pursue strategies of wealth defense outside 
the political theater. To contend for office (or, for the ethnic Chinese, to fund 
indigenous Indonesians who run), oligarchs have to deploy huge sums of money, 
sometimes down to the village level.
The other thing that changed when the New Order ended, however, is that 
Indonesia went practically overnight from having Suharto to constrain oligarchs to 
having to rely on the country's debilitated legal infrastructure to do the job. 
Unfortunately for the nation, there are no longer any strong, independent, or 
impersonal institutions of law and enforcement to which Indonesia's most powerful 
actors must submit. On matters of property, wealth, economy, corruption, and 
criminality of all kinds, the law bends to individual oligarchs and elites rather than the 
reverse. This is because these actors have the material power resources at their disposal 
to buy and distort the legal system, from the police and prosecutors up to the judges 
and politicians. The multiple pathologies this creates in Indonesia have undercut the 
momentum of Reformasi and spawned dangerous longings for the predictability of an 
iron-fisted leader.
There has been a steady, but misplaced, undercurrent of dissatisfaction with 
Indonesia's democracy. Rampant corruption, elected officials who perform wretchedly, 
indecisive leadership, a surge in fundamentalist and sometimes violent Islamic 
politics,14 and slower economic growth rates have been blamed on Indonesia's 
democratic transition after 1998. It is not uncommon to hear people at all levels of 
society express nostalgia for the order of Suharto's regime. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Kiki 
Syahnakri, the vice-chair of Indonesia's vocal Association of Retired Officers, opined 
that "from a social and cultural perspective, Indonesia is just too unwieldy for the 
extreme liberal democracy we've adopted."15 When pressed on the point that 
Indonesians have conducted themselves nonviolently and responsibly during the 
many national and local elections held since 1998, and that the worst distortions of the 
system have been at the hands of oligarchs, Syahnakri insisted the blame rests with 
average citizens. "The problem is not that the people are violent, it is that they are ill- 
prepared for the choices they are making in elections and end up letting themselves be 
more influenced by money than anything else."16
Even some academics have added their voices to the democratic critique. After 
reviewing the higher growth rates achieved during the Suharto dictatorship and 
lamenting Indonesia's weaker economic performance since the transition to
14 "In Religion's Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia," Human Rights Watch, February 
2013, at http: / / www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia0213_ForUpload_0.pdf, accessed July 
31,2013.
15 Interview with the author, Jakarta, May 12, 2012.
“ Ibid.
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democracy, Duncan and McLeod write: "According to Sir Winston Churchill: 'It has 
been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.' The post-Soeharto decline in Indonesia's 
economic performance calls this view into question."17 In fact, it is misguided to suggest 
that democracy is to blame for slower growth rates since the inception of Reformasi. If 
anything, Indonesia's democracy works remarkably well considering the political 
damage inflicted on the body politic for a decade by Sukarno and then for three 
decades by Suharto. An alternative explanation is that it was Indonesia's other 
transition in 1998, from a tamed to an untamed oligarchy, that caused risks and costs to 
rise for those controlling capital, resulting in more uncertainty, higher costs for reliable 
wealth defense, and lower rates of investment. Indonesia's overarching "problem" is 
that the country is burdened by a group of powerful oligarchs and elites whose 
pathological behaviors are barely constrained. And, regrettably, electoral democracy is 
poorly designed to tame them. Indeed, Indonesia's oligarchs and elites have actually 
captured and now thoroughly dominate the country's democratic institutions, and yet 
do not appear capable of using them collectively to achieve a civil oligarchy with a 
strong legal infrastructure that would defend property rights in exchange for oligarchs 
themselves submitting to the rule of law.
Oligarchic Scale, Intensity, and Material Power Index
One of the most dramatic transformations in Indonesia's political economy since 
the end of World War II, but especially after the collapse of Sukarno's Old Order, is the 
rise of extreme material stratification. As the data presented at the outset showed, this 
development produced a crop of fabulously wealthy and powerful actors at the apex of 
the system. Indeed, wealth in Indonesia today is probably more concentrated in the 
hands of a few oligarchs than it has been for most of the archipelago's recorded 
history. Table 1 presents comparative data on the forty richest Indonesians. The data 
focus on oligarchic scale, intensity, and their Material Power Index (MPI). These 
indicators provide insights into the proportion of the country's total material 
endowments concentrated in the hands of a tiny segment of the population, as well as 
the relative material power of oligarchs compared to that of the average Indonesian.
With an average net worth of US$2.13 billion, the oligarchic scale of the forty 
richest Indonesians is substantially larger than that of their counterparts in Southeast 
Asia. Indonesia's top billionaires are, on average, over 50 percent richer than those in 
Singapore, own wealth at roughly double the scale of those in Thailand, and have 
accumulated fortunes more than 250 percent larger than those of Filipino oligarchs.
17 My emphasis. Duncan and McLeod (2007, 75) press on: "Can we actually say that the institutional 
changes that constitute Indonesia's recent democratisation are generally for the better? To put it more 
bluntly: was democratisation the right approach? Or was it a mistake to impose such a system on 
Indonesia at this stage of its development, simply because it has been highly successful in the West? 
Certainly, the changes allow wide participation in politics by citizens and their organisations, but what 
about the impact on economic performance? As noted at the outset, the record does not look good so far, 
eight years down the track. Will matters eventually improve of their own accord? Not necessarily." Ron 
Duncan and Ross H. Mcleod, "The State and the Market in Democratic Indonesia," in Indonesia: Democracy 
and the Promise o f Good Governance, ed. Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 73-92.
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Robert and Michael Hartono, who own the Djarum empire valued at US$14 billion (an 
increase of US$3 billion in one year), control the single largest fortune in Southeast 
Asia. A different pattern is evident for the measure of oligarchic intensity (the weight 
of the upper oligarchs' wealth-power in the overall economy). The combined fortunes 
of the top forty oligarchs in Indonesia equal 10 percent of GDP. This figure is modest, 
however, compared to 20.4 percent in Singapore and 26 percent in Malaysia.
Table 1. Wealth of Top Forty Oligarchs
Oligarchic Scale, Intensity, and Material Power Index in Selected Countries, 2011
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Oligarchic 
Scale (bln) $3.78 $2.13 $0.85 $16.66 $1.14 $1.61 $3.78 $2.32 $1.64 $1.36
Total of 40 
(bln) $151 $85 $34 $667 $45 $64 $151 $93 $66 $54
Rank 1 
(bln) $9.30 $14.00 $7.20 $59.00 $7.40 $12.40 $22.00 $8.80 $9.30 $8.90
Rank 40 
(bln) $1.86 $0.63 $0.09 $7.00 $0.20 $0.16 $0.95 $0.93 $0.53 $0.21
GDP/
capita $5,203 $3,361 $2,082 $47,992 $5,151 $8,479 $33,667 $21,844 $23,804 $49,352
Oligarchic
Intensity 2.2 10.2 15.7 4.4 13.1 26.0 62.3 18.4 5.7 20.4
Material
Power
Index
726,504 632,740 408,261 347,141 221,316 189,881 112,276 106,207 68,896 27,557
Notes: Data on forty richest oligarchs is from Forbes "40 Richest," 2011, www.forbes.com. Data on GDP 
and GDP/capita are from the CIA Factbook. Oligarchic scale (row 1) is the average wealth of the top 40 
oligarchs (in US$ billions). Oligarchic intensity (row 6) is the total wealth of the top 40 oligarchs (row 2) as 
a percent of GDP. The Material Power Index (row 7) is the average wealth of the top 40 oligarchs (row 1) 
divided by GDP/capita (row 5). The MPI is a measure also presented in Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. 
Page, "Oligarchy in the United States?" Perspectives on Politics 7,4 (December 2009): 731-53; and Winters, 
Oligarchy, although in those studies median income was used instead of GDP/ capita. Calculations by the 
author.
The most telling figures are contained in the Material Power Index, which 
measures the gap in material resources separating oligarchs from average citizens in 
their societies. Although there were rich and poor Indonesians at independence in 
1945, the distribution of wealth was relatively egalitarian by twenty-first century 
standards. The MPI separating political leaders from common Indonesians was a 
multiple in the hundreds, while the MPI separating the richest traders from the median 
citizen was at most a multiple in the low thousands.18 In 2010, the MPI of the richest 
Indonesians was over 630,000 to 1. This extreme stratification in Indonesia is 50 percent 
higher than in the Philippines, more than twice that seen in Thailand, over three times
18 Amry Vandenbosch, "A Problem in Java: The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies," Pacific Affairs 3,11 
(1930): 1001-17. See also M. C. Ricklefs, A Flistory o f  Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008).
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the gap in Malaysia, and more than twenty times the gap between the fortunes of the 
very rich and the rest in Singapore.
Although individual wealth is a key power resource across all polities and 
throughout history, the political potency of that wealth varies significantly. Policy 
changes, legal regimes, institutional arrangements, and countervailing power resources 
such as coercion and mass mobilization can amplify or diminish the impact of wealth- 
power (though rarely neutralize it completely or permanently). Weaknesses in 
Indonesian civil society, the rapid dispersion of popular forces after Suharto's fall, and 
the institutional capture of Indonesian politics by oligarchs (especially via political 
parties and the media) has allowed the power of wealth to expand with each new 
round of electoral contestation.
This is not to say that Indonesia's democracy is a sham. On the contrary, by the 
procedural standards of Schumpeter's "free competition for a free vote" and Dahl's 
criteria of "contestation and inclusiveness,"19 Indonesia performs reasonably well. It is 
true that candidates sometimes unleash dirty tricks against each other, that there have 
been irregularities with voter lists, and the biggest portion of campaign finance is off 
the books (an important point revisited below). And yet, the country has held three 
national elections since 1999, on time, every five years. It has also held hundreds of 
regional elections on a regular basis. Unlike in the Philippines, where election-related 
fatalities are high and candidates are assassinated, democracy in Indonesia is 
passionate but generally peaceful. Candidates follow most electoral rules, parties take 
turns campaigning according to the published schedules, voters cast their ballots in 
secret, and losing candidates overwhelmingly step down without resistance. There is 
freedom of assembly, expression, and the press. Although there is little ideology 
involved, and party platforms are fairly meaningless, various matters get raucously 
debated as parties and candidates try to shape the discourse. Most importantly, the 
winners are not known in advance. There have been surprising and sometimes 
spectacular wins and losses.
All of this political activity unfolds in a context of a poorly organized civil society, 
which augments the influence of oligarchs. In one sense, civil society in Indonesia is 
active and robust. Reflecting the country's liberal freedoms, there is a proliferation of 
organizations, causes, seminars, workshops, and publications. This political 
engagement can sometimes deliver defeats to oligarchs and elites. But for reasons of 
history and culture, civil society in Indonesia is also badly fragmented, poorly 
mobilized, and provides an ineffective counterbalance to the captive grip oligarchs 
have on how democracy functions. As in other democracies where the power of wealth 
is deployed with few limitations, oligarchs play a central role in shaping who can 
contend for office or get appointed to top political posts. The result is that Indonesians 
get to choose among options that are strongly oligarchically determined.
19 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd edition (New York, NY: Harper 
Perennial, [1942] 2008), chapter 22; and Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1972).
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Oligarchs Fund Jokowi
The election of Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2012 provides a useful 
illustration of the role oligarchic intervention plays in the democratic choices available 
to Indonesians. Jokowi challenged and defeated the incumbent Jakarta governor, Fauzi 
Bowo, a classic oligarchic apparatchik. Part of Jokowi's strategy was to pretend he did 
not have a strategy. Instead, he adopted an "aw shucks" public posture of relaxed 
simplicity, made a lot of jokes, and spent much of his time visiting ordinary people and 
the poor across the capital. The intended message was that, as an outsider from the city 
of Surakarta, he was untainted by the notorious "money politics" game that infuses 
most Indonesian political contests. As a candidate, he presented very few concrete 
plans for solving Jakarta's chronic problems and never explained how he would 
confront the capital's powerful and deeply entrenched interests.
His efforts to distance himself from the fact that his candidacy was possible only 
because he had major oligarchic backers reached comical proportions during the 
campaign. The following exchange unfolded on live television in July 2012, soon after 
Jokowi outpaced Fauzi in the first round of voting:
Kami (TVOne host): Bagaimana dengan adanya tuduhan sekarang ini bahwa 
ternyata timnya Pak Jokowi melakukan money politics? [What about accusations 
lately that it turns out your team has engaged in money politics?]
Jokowi: [Laughs] Money politics duitnya dari mana, Pak Kami? Untuk kampanye 
saja saya harus jualan baju ... Lihat spanduk saya paling sedikit. Money politics di 
mana? Duitnya dari mana? [Money politics, money from where, Mr. Kami? Just 
to campaign I have to sell T-shirts. Notice I've got the fewest banners. Where is 
the money politics? Money from where?]
Kami: Habiskan berapa kalau kampanye kemarin? [How much did you spend 
on your recent campaign?]
Jokowi: Kurang-lebih antara ... [stuttering] ... lima-belasan. [More or less around 
... fifteenish.]
Kami: [Incredulous] Lima-belasan ... milyardl? [Fifteenish ... billion [rupiah]!?] 
[which is about US$1.5 million]
Jokowi: Ya ... itupun hampir 90 percent itu dari sumbangan. [Yeah ... and even 
that was almost 90 percent from donations.] [The candidate then mentions a list 
of ordinary folk, friends, and family who donated.]
Kami: Lima-belas milyard itu hampir tidak masuk akal untuk [kampanye] 
gubernur Jakarta, Pak, karena bupati saja di Jawa sekarang paling kurang lima- 
puluh [milyard], Pak.20 [Fifteen billion makes almost no sense in a campaign for 
governor of Jakarta, sir, because even running for regent in Java now costs at 
least fifty, sir.]
20 "Jokowi vs Fauzi Bowo di Indonesian Lawyers Club (ILC) \ ..." Video clip, YouTube, July 17, 2012. 
http: / / www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mzjllvkWuwo, accessed July 31, 2013.. This forum, hosted by Kami 
Ilyas, was televised live by TVOne from the Indonesia Lawyers' Club in Jakarta. Guests interviewed via 
satellite included Joko Widodo and Governor Fauzi Bowo.
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Days later, Tempo magazine published a revealing article focusing on the oligarchs 
backing Jokowi's candidacy.21 The key enablers were tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo 
and his brother Gen (ret.) Prabowo Subianto, who will contest the presidency in 2014 
as the candidate of the Gerindra party, which Hashim also heavily subsidizes. At the 
last minute, a supportive role was also played by former president and PDI-P (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) head 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (against the designs of her husband, Taufik Kiemas).22
Despite Jokowi being a recently elected PDI-P mayor of a medium-size city, it was 
Gerindra that set his candidacy in motion. Muhammad Taufik, chairman of Gerindra 
Jakarta, noted that communications with Jokowi intensified toward the end of 2011. 
Prabowo met him in February of 2012 following an invitation arranged by Hashim, 
who had known Jokowi for several years. Within weeks the candidate had an audience 
with Hashim himself. It was at this meeting that Jokowi was asked by Hashim to enter 
the Jakarta gubernatorial contest. Funding commitments were also made.23 Meanwhile, 
Prabowo met with a reluctant Megawati to urge her to back her own party's candidate. 
If she did not agree, he was ready to cobble together an alliance of smaller parties to 
back the plan. It was Hashim and Prabowo who selected Jokowi's running mate 
(Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, nicknamed "Ahok") and announced to the press the duet's 
intention to run. Prabowo told the reporters he was even willing to serve as chairman 
of the campaign team.
In early March 2012, the PDI-P had invited Jokowi to Jakarta to subject him to a 
five-minute "fit and proper" test, and to explore his readiness to seek Jakarta's top 
office. He informed Megawati that he was willing, but that despite the fact that he was 
a minor millionaire, the obvious obstacle was money. With a personal net worth of 
only US$3 to US$5 million,24 he lacked the funds to mount an effective Jakarta-scale 
campaign against the well-heeled incumbent. Only oligarchs had the power resources 
to convert Jokowi's potential as a candidate into a reality. In the event, Prabowo had 
already signaled to Jokowi via Ahok that the necessary resources would be provided. 
Tempo reports:
Prabowo first met Ahok around [the] end of February [2012] at the 
Intercontinental Hotel in Jakarta. Ahok said, "I don't have money," and Prabowo 
responded, "I'm not asking for your money. We will bear all the expenses."
21 This section draws on Widiarsi Agustina et. at, "Who Owns Jokowi?" Tempo, July 24 2012,
http: / / asiaviews.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38312:who-owns-jokowi&catid 
=1: headlines&Itemid=22, accessed July 31, 2013; and Widiarsi Agustina et. at, "Jokowi Tak Mau Didikte 
Prabowo dan Mega," Tempo, July 23, 2012, http:/ / www.tempo.co/read/new s/2012/07/23/078418627/ 
Jokowi-Tak-Mau-Didikte-Partai-Pengusungnya, accessed July 31, 2013.
22 According to a leading official in one of the smaller parties close to the action, Megawati was offered 
between US$2 to US$3 million in "party assistance" to side with the incumbent in the Jakarta race. After 
she backed Jokowi, the offer was withdrawn. Confidential interview, January 30, 2013.
23 Confidential sources indicate that Hashim's outlay for the first round exceeded US$5 million. Other 
oligarchs were also tapped for contributions.
24 The Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan KorupsiJ June 2012 report on 
Jokowi estimated his assets to be Rp. 28.9 billion. Some estimates of his wealth reach as high as US$15 
million. Most of his holdings are in the form of property, a factory, and deposits.
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Feeling odd, Ahok asked, "Then how do I return the favor? Do you want [the] 
MRT [mass rapid transportation] project for Pak Hashim?"25
Prabowo, Hashim, and Gerindra were vying for something much larger than Jakarta's 
stalled transit project. They wanted to strengthen their strategic position in the capital 
while forging closer bonds with Megawati and PDI-P—vital partners in Prabowo's bid 
for the presidency and for Hashim's wealth defense goals.
The wildly popular Jokowi's victory over the sitting governor was due to a 
groundswell of support from scores of groups ranging from students to housewives' 
associations that helped propel him to victory. This important democratic part of the 
story was made possible, however, by a prior oligarchic move in which the power of 
wealth placed Jokowi before the voters in the first place. Even if he did come to enjoy 
grassroots support, he did not arrive at the gubernatorial contest as a consequence of 
grassroots initiatives or politics.
Media, Oligarchs, and Parties
Politically ambitious oligarchs also pursue a strategic position in Indonesia's mass 
media market. Following a short burst of new media voices that emerged after 1998, 
big money moved aggressively to consolidate most sources of information and 
communication into roughly a dozen hands.26 Table 2 presents a snapshot of the 
dominant groups. This process accelerated once big political players realized the media 
could make or break a candidate. A small number of oligarchs now own the vast 
majority of Indonesia's print, television, radio, and online media outlets. In 1997, on 
the eve of Suharto's collapse, there were 289 print media outlets. This exploded during 
the democratic transition to 1,381 in 1999 and 1,881 in 2001. But by 2006 the number 
had dropped back to 889.
Major media groups own five out of the six Indonesian newspapers with the 
highest circulation and all of the four biggest online news media sites. They also own 
the overwhelming majority of flagship radio networks originating from Jakarta and the 
largest cities, and a large proportion of local radio stations. The vitally important TV 
market is dominated by national TV stations that control over 90 percent of viewer 
hours across the archipelago. Ownership of TV stations is concentrated into five 
companies that control 96.6 percent of all national stations.27 Indonesia's media outlets 
are free in the sense that muscular intimidation from the state is now rare. But they are 
also thoroughly corporate and dominated by super-powerful oligarchs.
25 "Who Owns Jokowi?" Tempo, July 24, 2012.
26 Data in this section draw on Nugroho, Yanuar, Dinita Andriana Putri, and Shita Laksmi, "Mapping the 
Landscape of the Media Industry in Contemporary Indonesia," Report Series: "Engaging Media, 
Empowering Society: Assessing Media Policy and Governance in Indonesia through the Lens of Citizens' 
Rights," Jakarta: CIPG and HIVOS, March, 2012, https: / / www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/ 
datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:168565&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF, accessed July 31, 
2013.
27 These are MNC (34.7 percent), TransTV and Trans7 (24.7 percent), Emtek's SCTV and Indosiar (23.9 
percent), TVOne and ANTV (10.8 percent), and MetroTV (2.5 percent). The only stations not owned by, or 
closely linked to, major political figures are SCTV and Indosiar.
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Table 2. Oligarchic Dominance of Media in Indonesia, 2011
Group TV Radio
Print
Media
Online
Media Other Businesses* Owner
1
Global
Mediacomm
(MNC)
20 22 7 1
Content production, 
Content
distribution, Talent 
management
Hary
Tanoesoedibjo
2
Jawa Pos 
Group 20 NA 171 1 Paper mills, printing plants, Power plant
Dahlan Iskan 
Azrul Ananda
3
Kelompok
Kompas
Gramedia
10 12 88 2
Property, 
Manufacturing, 
Bookstore chain, 
Event organizer, 
University
Jacob Oetama
4
Mahaka
Media
Group
2 19 5 NA Event organizer, PR consultant
Abdul Gani, 
Erick Thoir
5
Elang
Mahkopta
Teknologi
3 NA NA 1 T elecommunications and IT solutions
Sariatmaadja
Family
6 CT Corp 2 NA NA 1
Financial services, 
Lifestyle and 
Entertainment, 
Natural resources, 
Property
Chairul
Tanjung
7 Visi Media Asia 2 NA NA 1
Natural resources, 
Network provider, 
Property
Bakrie and 
Brothers
8 MediaGroup 1 NA 3 NA Property (Hotel) Surya Paloh
9 MRA Media NA 11 16 NA
Retail, Property, 
Food and beverage, 
Automotive
Adiguna 
Soetowo and 
Soetikno 
Soedarjo
10 FeminaGroup NA 2 14 NA
Talent agency, 
Publishing
Pia
Alisjahbana
11 Tempo Inti Media 1 NA 3 1
Documentary­
making
Yayasan
Tempo
12
Beritasatu
Media
Holding
2 NA 10 1
Property, Health 
services, Cable TV, 
Internet service 
provider, University
Lippo Group
* "Other Businesses" refers to businesses run by the same owner or group owner.
Source: This table is from Nugroho, Yanuar, Dinita Andriana Putri, and Shita Laksmi, "Mapping the 
Landscape of the Media Industry in Contemporary Indonesia," Table 4.1, p. 39.
The ideological spectrum for the media ranges from conservative to extreme right- 
wing. Most conflicts and debates among the media arise because of clashes between 
the oligarchic personalities or political groups that own them. The only other major 
variation across publications or broadcasts is whether they are stuffy and up-market 
(like Kompas and MetroTV) or churn out sensationalist, burlesque, or even 
superstitious fare for the wider market (of which there are too many examples to 
mention). Serious presidential contenders for the 2014 elections (and major local 
elections) must buy media access, which in some cases has meant buying television
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and radio stations and newspapers outright. Prabowo and his brother Hashim are in 
the market to buy TV stations.28 Another major oligarch has invested heavily in 
television and is planning to launch his own national polling outfit in 2013 with the 
explicit goal of influencing the 2014 presidential contest.29
Oligarchic candidates also buy political parties—or buy their way up the party 
ranks. This happens in several ways. At the regional and local level, candidates pay 
large sums to party leaders to gain national party support. But the flow also goes 
downward. Those seeking to be party leaders compete by making enormous payouts 
to delegates at national party congresses to outflank opponents for posts like party 
chairperson or secretary general. And in some cases, oligarchs use their money power 
(or that of their supporters if they are not yet big fish) to create new parties out of 
nothing. This is what Hashim and Prabowo did with Gerindra, and Surya Paloh did 
with NasDem. The idea is to make yourself party chair so that you can be catapulted to 
the presidency. The strategy worked well for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
who was financed by fewer than a dozen oligarchs until he became one himself.
The last phase of buying a party unfolds during the frenzied process of trying to 
cobble together enough representation in the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
Indonesia's parliament) to meet the threshold to be a presidential contender. In 2009, 
candidates for the presidency required the support of parties that held at least 20 
percent of DPR seats, or which had won 25 percent of the vote. There is always plenty 
of political horse trading regarding vice-presidential running mates and promises of 
cabinet posts. But such deals are never enough to make a successful alliance or 
coalition in Indonesia. A presidential hopeful must also be ready to pay many millions 
of dollars in cash to his or her party allies. A portion of the payoff flows to the other 
parties' coffers, and some goes directly into the pockets of party leaders as a political 
closing fee for being the direct negotiators of the deals. Oligarchic and elite forms of 
power tend to be mutually supporting within Indonesia's electoral ruling oligarchy. 
Table 3 summarizes the oligarchic moorings of major political figures within 
Indonesia's democracy.
28 Nugroho et. al. sum up the concentration and consolidation of Indonesia's media this way: "Today, 
twelve large media groups control nearly all of Indonesia's media channels, including broadcasting, print 
media, and online media. They are MNC Group, Kompas Gramedia Group, Elang Mahkota Teknologi,
Visi Media Asia, Jawa Pos Group, Mahaka Media, CT Group, Beritasatu Media Holdings, Media Group, 
MRA Media, Femina Group, and Tempo Inti Media. MNC Group has three free-to-air television 
channels—the highest number owned by any media group—with twenty local television networks and 
twenty-two radio networks under its subsidiary, Sindo Radio. Jawa Pos Group has 171 print media 
companies, including its Radar Group. Kompas, Indonesia's most influential newspaper, has expanded its 
network to include a content provider by establishing KompasTV, besides the existing twelve radio 
broadcasters under its subsidiary Sonora Radio Network, and eighty-nine other print media companies. 
Visi Media Asia has grown into a powerful media group with two terrestrial television channels (ANTV 
and tvOne) and its quickly growing online media channel vivanews.com. A new media company under 
Lippo Group, i.e., Berita Satu Media Holding, has already established an Internet-Protocol Television 
(IPTV) BeritasatuTV, online media channel beritasatu.com, and additionally owns a number of newspapers 
and magazines. [... ] Some important M&As have taken place recently: Indosiar was acquired by Elang 
Mahkota Teknologi, a holding company of SCTV; detik.com was bought out by CT Group, the owner of 
Trans TV and Trans 7; a number of local television channels were taken over by large groups such as MNC 
Group with its Sindo TV network and Jawa Pos, which has its own TV network. Laws and regulations 
seem to be toothless in controlling the concentration of the industry as such." See Nugroho, et. al., 
"Mapping the Landscape," pp. 4-5.
29 Confidential interview, Jakarta, July 18, 2012.
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Table 3. Indonesia's Oligarchic Democracy
Politician Oligarch
Oligarch
Backers Media
Owns/Bought
Party
Aburizal Bakrie
(11% of TV)
Yes Self
Dahlan Iksan
(also SBY links)
TVOne, ANTV,
Visi Media Asia,
Vivanews.com
(Anindya)
Jawa Pos Group 
(Radar, TV network)
Yes (Golkar)
Susilo Bambang Hidden Budi Sampoerna, Media N usa Yes
Yudhoyono (Yes) Sunaryo Sampoerna, Pradana (Jurnal (Democrat
(27% of TV) Ramadhan Pohan  
Chairul Tanjung
James Riady 
(Peter Gontha)
[2004 Aburizal 
Bakrie, Jusuf Kalla] 
Squeezed Chinese
Nasional)
Trans Corp (TransTV, 
Trans 7), Detik.com  
Lippo Media,
Berita Satu Media 
Holdings (Suara 
Pembaruan, Jakarta 
Globe, Investor Daily, 
BeritaSatu.com)
Party)
Surya Paloh
(36% of TV)
Yes Self MetroTV,
Media Indonesia
Yes (NasDem)
Prabowo Yes Self
Hashim (brother)
Trying to buy 
TV stations
Yes (Gerindra)
Wiranto Yes Self (Cendana?) 
H ary Tanoesoedibjo 
(had SBY links, 
then Surya Paloh 
links)
MNC Group,
RCTI, Global TV,
MNC TV, Sindo Radio, 
Seputar Indonesia, 
Okezone.com
Yes (Hanura)
Megawati Hidden Taufik Kiemas 
Arifin Panigoro
— Genetic (PDIP)
Jusuf Kalla Yes Self — Yes (Golkar
2004, 2014?)
If one wants to win at this money-driven game—and not already an oligarch who 
commands a large personal fortune—one must get the financial backing of big 
Indonesian oligarchs who can supply the political cash. The risk parameters are
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sufficiently understood and anticipated by most oligarchs so that they supply funds 
strategically and "voluntarily." But sometimes persuasion is needed, often involving a 
strong element of extortion. Candidates and their backers threaten—implicitly or 
explicitly—to harass or punish oligarchs who refuse to provide financial support. Past 
or dormant legal cases can always be revived (for instance, to target Prabowo, 
President SBY suddenly backed an initiative to form an ad hoc body to investigate 
alleged human rights abuses perpetrated in 1998), and key business permits can 
suddenly be revoked or mysteriously require review. One of the most important 
political calculations an oligarch can make—and this is especially true for vulnerable 
ethnic Chinese oligarchs who have severely limited opportunities to augment their 
material power via the wealth-defense levers of office—is deciding which candidates 
to support and how much cash to supply.30
There is no shortage of illegality behind the major fortunes in Indonesia. This 
leaves oligarchs permanently vulnerable to being squeezed. Even if these oligarchs 
wanted to play strictly by institutionalized legal rules (and many of them probably do), 
this presumes that there are clear legal codes and procedures to follow in the first 
place. Such is not the case in Indonesia. This is partly because of outdated and 
contradictory laws dating back to Dutch colonial times, and partly a reflection of 
greater regional autonomy after 1998, which has resulted in conflicting laws across 
multiple jurisdictions (nowhere is this problem more prevalent than in the regulations 
and mappings covering land status, boundaries, ownership, and use).
But an equally important reason why there is so much legal disarray is that legal 
uncertainty plays a vital role in the constant game of extortion and forced-sharing that 
redistributes wealth among Indonesia's oligarchs and elites. The biggest game in town 
is not energetic wealth creation via industry and services, but aggressive wealth 
redistribution among the powerful after it has been extracted from the country's 
declining natural resource endowments. Oligarchs and politicians must master this 
game of money, elections, office, law, and extortion if they are to win (or just survive) 
in the country's challenging political economy. This is not a transient aspect of 
Indonesian politics that is likely to fade as the "quality of democracy" improves in the 
electoral cycles that lie ahead. Rather, it is a defining characteristic of how oligarchy 
and democracy are blended in contemporary Indonesia. And however much those 
playing the game at the top may complain about the distortions all of this causes for 
the nation's politics, or how disgusted they feel personally taking part in it, these 
relationships between the power of money and politics are deep and self-regenerating.
Beyond Oligarchy?
Recent work on oligarchs and oligarchy has generated welcomed debate, some of 
which is represented in this issue. One criticism, raised by Aspinall and by Caraway 
and Ford, is that oligarchic theory does not sufficiently emphasize politics from below 
and says very little about potentially important actors like activists, workers, and
30 Another motivation mentioned by the oligarch seeking to launch a polling firm was to gain access to 
more reliable data about who was doing well to ensure funds were more effectively channeled to 
politicians who could be helpful or damaging to him. Confidential interview, Jakarta, July 14, 2012.
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unions.31 These authors do not seriously dispute the claim that the current distribution 
of power in Indonesia favors oligarchs and elites over much weaker, fragmented social 
forces. But they do advance the fairly uncontroversial observation that a 
comprehensive perspective on politics (of which oligarchic theory is a part) must 
incorporate all serious contenders for power. It is certainly true that dominance by a 
relatively small group of oligarchs and elites in one period hardly means these power 
positions are fixed.
It is noteworthy that neither my study of oligarchy (2011) nor that by Robison and 
Hadiz (2004) argues that other social forces are irrelevant, even if these other groups 
and actors are not the focus of these works. My own approach to oligarchy is explicitly 
grounded in power resource theory, which emphasizes power capacities ranging from 
the material resources of oligarchs to the mobilizational, coercive, and organizational- 
positional power of other players. The distributions of these power resources are 
understood to vary both within and across cases. For instance, non-material power 
resources (including the mobilizational power of unions and parties) were vastly more 
important in Indonesia prior to the decline of Sukarno in the late 1960s. It was only 
after Suharto took over that oligarchic power arose and mobilizational power was 
systematically attacked and subverted. In my treatment of the United States case, I 
emphasize how the populist movement of the 1890s and early 1900s delivered major 
setbacks to oligarchs when a federal income tax exclusively targeting the ultra-rich was 
imposed twice—the second time by an enormous popular victory in the form of a 
constitutional amendment oligarchs resisted vigorously. Reading Aspinall and 
Caraway and Ford, one could get the mistaken impression that theorists of oligarchy 
believe oligarchs dominate everything everywhere, crowd out all other politics, and 
always win. Oligarchs not only lose many wealth-defense battles, but throughout 
history they have repeatedly been extinguished as a group. In the division of labor that 
is academia, it is fortunate that researchers analyze different elements of very complex 
political economies involving oligarchs, elites, states, warlords, students, activists, 
workers, and farmers. That said, scholars are not really engaging the work of their 
colleagues if their main criticism amounts to: You do not pay enough attention to the 
part I study.
The point of Oligarchy is to offer a re-theorization of oligarchs and oligarchy by 
excavating, refining, and partly redefining the concepts involved. Important facets of 
oligarchy—especially its many intersections and fusions with various forms of politics 
and rule—are developed in the book through multiple cases that overlap with 
Indonesia as often as they diverge from it. The justification of a book-length 
exploration focused on oligarchs is not the proposition that oligarchs are the only 
actors worthy of sustained attention. Rather, it is that the power of oligarchs is wildly 
disproportionate to their numbers (including in democracies), that there are specific 
political challenges oligarchs face inherent in the conflicts generated by extreme wealth
31 Edward Aspinall, "Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation," in this issue; Teri L. Caraway and Michele Ford, "Labor Unions and Electoral Contests in 
Democratic Indonesia," paper presented at "Beyond Oligarchy? Critical Exchanges on Accountability and 
Representation in Indonesia," the University of Sydney, December 14-15, 2012. Versions of these essays 
are slated for publication in a forthcoming volume on oligarchy in Indonesia from Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program Publications.
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stratification (and their position at the top rather than the bottom), and that 
concentrated material power manifests unique qualities that deserve careful and 
separate theorization. It is for these reasons, among others, that an understanding of 
oligarchs and oligarchy is not amenable to being folded into a generic "pluralist" optic 
of the sort Pepinsky advocates in this issue.32
Aspinall presents a second and rather different critique centered on how to 
interpret the collapse of the Suharto regime, the democratic transition, and the politics 
that followed. Going beyond the general call for keeping the analytical lens wide, he 
advances a much more specific claim that Indonesia's democratic transition in 1998 
was driven from below. His argument is not merely that mass actions played a vital 
conclusive role in toppling a regime that was already damaged. It is that Suharto 
stepped down because of a political process he says was "society-initiated." The 
position Aspinall is critiquing acknowledges that societal forces played a role in the 
collapse of the New Order, but contends that activists and demonstrators followed and 
finished rather than led and initiated. This view posits that students in particular arose 
as a relatively inchoate "mobilization of the last minute" that took advantage of an 
already weakened regime reeling from the worst economic shock it had endured since 
the hyper-inflation of the 1960s, a regime that was badly fragmented from within and 
was less enthusiastically supported by foreign allies than at any time since Suharto 
came to power (with US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin taking the lead in tightening 
the noose around the aging dictator's neck).
This interpretation argues that the financial crisis that erupted in 1997 was more
destabilizing than past ruptures because the regime was less solidly backed by 
oligarchs and elites at home (including in the military) and strategic partners abroad.33 
Students and other actors in civil society read the signals that Suharto was exposed and 
vulnerable—some communicated directly through players within the New Order 
regime. Pouring into the fissures opened by the financial crisis and the disarray at the 
top, emboldened students formed the backbone of a people-power moment that 
convinced Suharto to step aside. The popular moment was so weak and unthreatening, 
however, that after one of the twentieth century's most murderous and corrupt 
dictators concluded his impromptu resignation, he calmly went home, watched TV for 
several years in his living room, and eventually died in a hospital bed surrounded by 
family and cronies.
Aspinall's counter-argument is that powerful movements from below, which had 
been gaining strength and momentum since the early 1990s, split open the regime. This
32 Across the decades, pluralism has come under sustained and effective criticism for its explanatory 
weaknesses when applied to cases like the United States. Pluralism lacks a sophisticated theory of the state 
and, by design, ignores material power rooted in social class. It is thus surprising to see calls for its 
transfer to Indonesia, where it promises to explain even less. The refashioned version of pluralism that 
Pepinsky wants to apply in Indonesia has its most important "interest group liberalism" component 
removed to better fit the Indonesian context. But the obvious question is: without this crucial element, 
what's left to apply? Compounding the problem is Pepinsky's effort to reduce the study of all politics and 
power to the analysis of policy outcomes.
33 The financial crisis hit Indonesia particularly hard because the country was more exposed to the risks of 
highly mobile capital flows than in earlier decades and relative to other countries in the region. See Jeffrey 
A. Winters, "The Determinants of Financial Crisis in Asia," in The Politics o f the Asian Economic Crisis, ed. T. 
J. Pempel (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1999): 79-97.
32 Jeffrey A. Winters
is not an easy interpretation to sustain.34 Although Aspinall grants that societal forces 
in Indonesia are chronically fragmented, he wants to credit them with constituting a 
mobilized movement that caused the cracks in the regime rather than took advantage of 
them. Curiously, he admits that the democratic transition immediately following 
Suharto's departure was dominated by elites and oligarchs rather than by societal 
forces. This suggests that the power position of civil society experiences unexplained 
oscillations. Thus, despite fragmentation, social forces were strong during the period 
leading up to 1997, and yet suddenly became weak during the transition years (which 
arguably should have been a period of triumph since the citizenry had just toppled a 
dictator). For reasons Aspinall does not explain, the disempowering effects of 
fragmentation were only temporary. Empowerment (despite chronic fragmentation) 
suddenly reappears in his approach to explain why Indonesia's oligarchs and elites do 
not win every political battle in the decade that follows.35
No one in this debate is arguing that forces from below were or are irrelevant. The 
fundamental question is whether it was a people-power movement or moment that 
pressured Suharto to abandon the presidency. For it to be a movement proper, we 
would have to see evidence of organization, networking, leadership, and some 
minimum of ideological coherence. These elements were scarcely present at the height 
of the mass actions, much less in the years leading up to 1998. A mobilization of the 
last minute—a people-power moment that is not the source of the regime's rupture, 
but which is cobbled together quickly to challenge an already weakened regime facing 
a crisis—is attainable even by fragmented social forces presented with an opening.
The various people assembled in protest in those months agreed on only one 
thing—that Suharto must go. Beyond that, there was very little consensus and a 
minimum of organization. Deep divisions were apparent almost immediately when 
one major student faction accepted the succession of Vice-President Habibie (because
34 Pepinsky's argument that Suharto's regime collapsed because of conflicting "coalitions" of investors 
who disagreed over currency and other policy options as the regime was reeling from a financial crisis is 
equally difficult to sustain. First, if such coalitions existed, there is no evidence the members ever met, 
strategized, or were even aware they were in a coalition. Second, if there existed a faction or coalition of 
oligarchs still committed to maintaining Suharto's rule, it was at most a very tiny set of actors comprising 
his children, Bob Hasan, and perhaps a couple others like Liem Sioe Liong, who regularly met Suharto 
face-to-face (suggesting loyalty of a decidedly personal nature). There was far more unity than 
disagreement among oligarchs of all stripes that Suharto had to go. Even oligarchs who are nostalgic 
today for the "pre-kids era" under Suharto freely admit that they stood aside and did not come to his aid, 
financially or otherwise, as the New Order fragmented and crashed. The determining differences that 
resulted in the collapse of Suharto's regime in Indonesia and stability of Mahathir's regime in Malaysia, 
respectively, were not coalitional conflict or unity among investors, but rather the significant differences in 
oligarchic posture across the two cases, the scale of mass mobilization, and the decisive refusal of the 
military to defend Suharto in the Indonesian case. See Thomas Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown 
o f Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). For an illuminating treatment of military defection and the durability of 
authoritarian regimes, see Eva Beilin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," Comparative Politics 44,2 (2012): 127-49.
35 In the political struggles between oligarchs and mass groups, effective organization is vitally important 
for the latter to sustain its victories. When activists, workers, or peasants are unable to mobilize 
themselves, material power is dominant by default. As Huber and Stephens observe, "power resource 
theory assumes that property and organization are political power resources and that, in the absence of 
organization, political power resources will be highly asymmetrically distributed and political decisions 
will reflect the interests of property holders." Huber and Stephens, Democracy and the Left, p. 35.
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of his Islamic credentials), while another rejected him as a New Order leftover. It was 
into this crumbling people-power moment that the formidably empowered oligarchs 
and elites came forward to supplant revolusi with reformasi and redirect the democratic 
transition toward an electoral politics they could embrace and dominate.36
Conclusions
Wealth-power always matters in politics, democratic or otherwise. In many 
respects, the interplay of oligarchs, wealth, media, parties, and democracy in Indonesia 
displays increasing similarities with the expression of oligarchic power in democracies 
such as the United States (including extreme concentration in media ownership). The 
main differences—and they are important—are that civil society and the rule of law are 
vastly stronger in the latter. Strong legal regimes do a double service of constraining 
individual oligarchs while providing the primary firmament for property and wealth 
defense. The two functions are intimately related in the politics of oligarchy, and the 
absence of these conjoined elements accounts for why Indonesia is best described as an 
electoral ruling oligarchy (in which being an oligarch is closely intertwined with 
governing) rather than the civil type as in the United States or Singapore.
The trend is clear. As Indonesian democracy consolidates, oligarchs are 
increasingly positioned as key arbiters of the country's political life. Their grip is 
particularly evident in the structure and operation of political parties—including 
oligarchic control over who can rise as contenders for party leadership, who can run 
for major offices, and how the political apparatus is used for purposes of wealth 
defense. Insofar as the media are heavily dominated by the same actors and political 
forces, it is unlikely that a critical free press or parties will provide the venues or 
vehicles for challenging this particular form of oligarchic domination. As for the 
potential of law to constrain oligarchs in the near or medium term, the prospects are 
equally grim. There is an expectation in the scholarly literature that as democratic 
consolidation progresses, gains will be made in the rule of law (typically portrayed as a 
"quality of democracy" matter). But there is no inherent reason for this to be so. A 
democracy thoroughly captured by oligarchs has no strong inherent incentives to 
impose independent and punishing legal constraints on itself. Nor is democracy 
necessarily unstable or vulnerable to crippling illegitimacy just because the legal 
regime is feeble at the top. Evidence from a broad sample of transitions to democracy 
globally suggest that "democracy without law" can persist for decades. It is a scenario 
Indonesia has been playing out since 1998.
“ In his critique of "leaderless" revolutions, Berkeley sociologist Cihan Tugal warns against the "fallacy 
that the people can take power without an agenda, an alternative platform, an ideology, and leaders." He 
continues: "Those who cannot represent themselves will be represented. This old statement regarding the 
French peasantry warns us against the beautification of non-organized masses, a romanticization now in 
high fashion. Multiple anti-representation theses from rival ideological corners (anarchist, liberal, 
autonomist, postmodernist, etc.) all boil down to the following assumption: when there is no meta­
discourse and no leadership, plurality will win." If this assumption is true at all, Tugal suggests, it holds 
only in the short run. See Cihan Tugal, "The End of the 'Leaderless' Revolution," Counterpunch, July 10, 
2013, at http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/10/the-end-of-the-leaderless-revolution/, accessed on 
July 31, 2013.
